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THE LEBANON COUNTY
HISTORICAL SOCIETY

LEBANON COUNTY AT THE
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

JOSEPH C. SAILE

VOL. XIII

1963

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LEBANON COUNTY AT THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

INTRODUCTION

Nestling among the rolling hills of Adams County, Pennsylvania, lies the small community of Gettysburg. Here and in the surrounding countryside on the first three days of July, 1863, was fought one of the most significant battles of the Civil War.

The Battle of Gettysburg marked the "High Water Mark" of the Confederacy. It was here that General Robert E. Lee had hoped to win a victory which would cause the withdrawal, from the many parts of the South, of Federal forces which had been threatening the Confederacy. A victory would also secure recognition of the Confederacy by foreign governments, carry panic into the North, and furnish fresh supplies for his gallant but impoverished troops. Had Lee won at Gettysburg, his invasion might well have had many far-reaching consequences. It is needless to say that all the results of the success of such an offensive were in the minds of Lee and the other Southern leaders. Victory, however, was not to belong to Lee; instead, the triumph was bestowed upon the little-known, but very astute and proficient, Major General George Gordon Meade, a native of Pennsylvania. The bitter struggle at Gettysburg was a very unique and surprising encounter; the battle was an accident and the outcome an astounding mistake.

Throughout the years the second and third days of conflict at Gettysburg have been described and glorified to a voluminous degree. Few persons realize that the key to the Union victory

was the intense fighting and stout resistance by the Northern forces on the first day. It was on this day, July 1, that the battle was actually decided. Despite the fact that the two days following offered many laudable incidents, if it had not been for the courageous Federal defense on the first day, it seems very unlikely that the ultimate outcome of the engagement would have gone in the direction it eventually did.

The terrain surrounding Gettysburg (see Map 3) offered a very excellent field for battle. One can see by a glance at a local relief map that the town acted as a pivotal point where roads from numerous directions met. These routes offered very accessible and convenient approaches for the converging forces. The hills immediately around Gettysburg are little more than continuous swells of ground sloping gently to the valleys between them. The countryside was dotted with small farms, rich in cultivated fields, orchards, and pastures, which spread across the landscape. West of the town is Seminary Ridge extending north and south over a distance of about five miles. To the east of Seminary Ridge, at a distance of about one mile and situated directly south of Gettysburg, is Cemetery Ridge. Three miles south of town this latter ridge culminates in a bold, rocky peak, several hundred feet high, called Big Round Top. Adjoining Big Round Top to the north is a similar peak, about one-half as high, termed Little Round Top. Dominating the northern extremity of Cemetery Ridge, extending in an easterly direction, are Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. This ridge and its adjacent heights formed the famous fishhook interior defense lines held by the Union forces on the second and third days of the Battle of Gettysburg. Two hundred yards west of Little Round Top, Devil's Den, a natural breastwork of solid rock, rises from the lowland marshes of a small creek known as Plum Run. To the west of Gettysburg, at a distance of about one and one-half miles, flows a small stream known as Willoughby Run. To the east of the town, at a distance of three-quarters of a mile, another stream, Rock Creek, meanders its way over the countryside. Over much of

this terrain some of the hardest fighting of the war was to take place. Many locations exemplifying this fact would go down in history: Devil's Den, Peach Orchard, Wheat Field, Plum Run (Bloody Run), "Bloody Angle," and many others.

The stage was set for one of the most exciting performances ever enacted in American military history by June 30, 1863. On the next day was to begin here the struggle which would become the Waterloo of the Confederacy. Today the Gettysburg battlefield is a national park offering to student and tourist alike an imaginative portrait of the magnificent proceedings of a century ago. To this day Gettysburg is not forgotten nor are its memories dimmed with the lapse of time. Lebanon County can be proud of its contributions on this memorable field and one can state that the part played by Lebanon County units, especially on the first day, was of primary importance to the ultimate victory of the Union forces on the battlefield at Gettysburg.

PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

Military Situation after Chancellorsville

The Battle of Chancellorsville, Virginia, ended on May 4, 1863. Here took place the last of all the Lee-Jackson maneuvers which had dramatically grasped victories from apparent defeats. Never again was this team to function. After Lieutenant General Thomas J. ("Stonewall") Jackson fell mortally wounded on May 2,¹ the first day of the battle, Lee, although still able to exhibit superb leadership, was never the same. He had lost his right arm and none could take its place.

Following the victory at Chancellorsville, the hour was at hand when an ultimate and decisive blow by the Army of Northern Virginia might decide the fate of the Union. During the month of May, Lee had visited the Confederate capital at Richmond on several occasions to discuss certain plans and considerations, both political and military, with the Southern leaders. The strategists had considered sending Lee's army to Vicksburg, which Major General Ulysses S. Grant was then besieging, or dispatching aid to the Tennessee theater where Confederate General Braxton Bragg was campaigning against Major General William S. Rosecrans. After much consideration it was decided that Vicksburg could hold and that the Eastern campaign was more strategic than the Tennessee campaign.²

To this time the South had won the major victories, but a prolonged conflict would result only in disaster if resources and materiel were not secured by the Southern forces. Thus, it was decided that the Army of Northern Virginia, which had just been reorganized into three new corps (First Corps under Lieutenant

¹ Jackson later died of complications.

² Frederick Tillberg, *Gettysburg National Military Park* (Washington, 1950), p. 3.

General James B. Longstreet, Second Corps under Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell, Third Corps under Lieutenant General Ambrose P. Hill),³ was to invade the North via the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, was to be the objective. This route would put the Southern army in a very strategic position to menace many key cities in the North, including Washington. The route of advance was well protected and offered a very secure highway into the North. At the same time, it also offered an agricultural section, rich in supplies very much needed by the Confederate army.


The plan of operations was similar to that conceived for Lee's invasion of 1862, which had been turned back at Antietam, Maryland. Lee planned to cut the east-west communications system across the Susquehanna River and then to turn his attention toward any other objectives, such as the cities of Baltimore, Washington, and Philadelphia, which might be advantageous to the Southern cause.⁴ The time was very favorable for an invasion. Lee's men and officers were extremely confident and proud of their commander. His army was in the prime of condition and, despite the new reorganization, conditions looked promising. Moreover, the North was discouraged by its losses and was very weary of war. As yet, no really capable general had been found, and the situation after Chancellorsville did not give the Union much cause for hope.

Movements of the Armies toward Gettysburg

General Lee set his army in motion on June 3, 1863 (see Map 1). Leaving General Hill at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in order to occupy Major General Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac, which was located around Falmouth, Lee sent General Ewell and

³ Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's lieutenants: a study in command* (3 vols.; New York, 1946), II, 13.

⁴ Tillberg, p. 4.



MAP 1
THE APPROACH

the Second Corps northwestward across the Blue Ridge Mountains at Front Royal, Virginia, and into the Shenandoah Valley.⁵ The selection of Ewell to lead the Army of Northern Virginia into the North was based primarily on his thorough knowledge of the terrain over which the Southern troops were to tread. Following the march of Ewell, General Longstreet and the First Corps proceeded northward on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge Mountains in order to cover the subsequent advance of General Hill and the Third Corps into the Shenandoah. After the forces of Hill had entered the valley and those of Longstreet had followed, the Confederate cavalry under Major General James E. B. Stuart was ordered to hold the mountain gaps until the Union army had advanced northward across the Potomac River.⁶

It had become obvious by June 6 to Hooker, who had been in relative ignorance concerning the plans of Lee, that the Army of Northern Virginia was on the move in a northerly direction; however, the Union general was still uncertain as to the objective Lee wished to reach. To Hooker it was not improbable that Washington was his destination. Thus, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, in order to ascertain the intentions of Lee, dispatched the First and Second Cavalry Divisions, under Brigadier General Alfred Pleasonton, up the Rappahannock River to reconnoiter the Confederate forces. This cavalry detachment engaged the Confederate cavalry under General Stuart at Beverly Ford (Fleetwood), Virginia, on June 9. Here, for the first time in the war, the Union cavalry fought on even terms with the dashing and much publicized Confederate horsemen. The 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, of which Company E was composed of men from Lebanon County, was one of the regiments in the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, of this detachment. The regiment acted as a support force for the artillery throughout the day and was constantly under fire.⁷ Thereafter, with the aid of better equip-

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Freeman, II, 33.

⁷ Harold P. Moyer. *History of the Seventeenth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry or One Hundred and Sixty-second in the line of Pennsylvania volunteer regiments* (Lebanon, 1911), p. 44.

ment and training, the Union cavalry became the exponent and leader in the art of cavalry warfare.

Hooker, upon receiving news of Ewell's successful march, abandoned his camp along the Rappahannock on June 13 and started north in pursuit of Lee. The movement of Hooker east of the Blue Ridge, on a line parallel to Lee on the west, kept Washington and Baltimore under constant protection.⁸ On the same date, Major General Robert H. Milroy, commander of the Union forces in the Shenandoah, learned from a prisoner that Ewell's entire corps was in the valley. Milroy, knowing that his position was critical since his forces were outnumbered four to one (36,000-9,000), but also feeling certain that Hooker was sending relief, resolved to restrain the Southern advance as long as possible. The two armies met on the heights of Winchester, Virginia, on June 14. In the ensuing struggle Ewell surrounded Milroy's force and, at 1:00 A.M., June 15, after a long struggle, General Milroy ordered a full retreat to Harper's Ferry.⁹

The Shenandoah Valley was now open. President Abraham Lincoln called out the state militia on June 15, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania answered this urgent plea with many thousand men. By this time the state was in a turmoil. All the horrors of an impending disaster were being felt throughout the middle Atlantic states, in general, and the counties of central Pennsylvania, in particular. The residents of Lebanon County were in a state of frenzy. Banks were closing and the money was

⁸ Hooker proposed to Lincoln on June 10 that he attack Hill, who was still south of the Rappahannock River, and then proceed south to threaten Richmond. Lincoln, stating that the army of Lee was the objective, rejected the suggestion.

⁹ Robert N. Scott (comp.), *The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies* (130 vols.; Washington, 1889), XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 92.

being transported to safer spots further north. Fortifications were being constructed throughout the area. Pennsylvania was preparing for a fight.¹⁰

In the interim Lee had begun extending his harassment into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Ewell, leading the Southern column, cut the the communications of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, thus preventing vital communications from reaching western Pennsylvania. Following the march of Ewell came the corps of Hill and Longstreet. These last two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River at Williamsport, Maryland, and Shepherdstown, Virginia, on June 26.¹¹ With the plans of Lee no longer in doubt, General Hooker led his army across the Potomac and out of Virginia at Edward's Ferry on the same day that Longstreet and Hill were crossing the river ten and twenty miles upstream.


Engagement of the 26th Emergency Volunteers

As these armies were crossing the Potomac about fifty miles to the south and west of Gettysburg, 8,000 men of the First Division, Second Corps (Ewell), under Major General Jubal A. Early, were advancing toward that town via the Chambersburg Road on their way to Wrightsville on the west bank of the Susquehanna River. The plan of Lee was to capture the bridge between that town and Columbia and then move on Harrisburg from the east (see Map 2).

It was of the utmost importance to the people of Pennsylvania that the movements of the enemy should be hindered in every possible way. Since Harrisburg was within such a short reach

¹⁰ Hiram H. Shenk, *A history of the Lebanon Valley in Pennsylvania* (2 vols.; Harrisburg, 1930), I, 48.

¹¹ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 348.



MAP 2

GETTYSBURG AND VICINITY

of the foe and the Union army was approaching, a delay of the Southern force, if for only a few hours, might be a decisive factor. To accomplish this delay, it was necessary to sacrifice the few for the benefit of the many. This sacrifice fell upon Colonel William W. Jennings and the eight hundred men of the 26th Emergency Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers.¹² Company E, led by Captain Joseph C. Brooks, was composed entirely of Lebanon County men. The first company commander, Captain Lorenzo L. Greenawalt, had been chosen major of the regiment subsequent to the enrollment of the company shortly after the middle of June.¹³ Having left Harrisburg two days earlier, the regiment passed through Gettysburg and then moved on the Chambersburg Road toward Cashtown, a small town nine miles to the northwest, at 10:00 A.M. on Friday, June 26. The unit advanced along the road about three miles to Marsh Creek where it was ordered to halt and to disperse in the field to the right of the pike.¹⁴

On reaching the forks of the road about one and one-half miles west of Cashtown, General Early sent Brigadier General John B. Gordon and his division of Georgia regiments, along with the 35th Virginia Cavalry, under Colonel Elijah V. White, on the Chambersburg Pike through Cashtown toward Gettysburg. Through some roadside information, Early had heard of the presence of a Union force at Gettysburg. Although he could secure no definite intelligence as to its size, Early decided to have Gordon and White skirmish the enemy while the remainder of his command would move to the left, through Hilltown and Mummasburg, flank and surround the enemy, and then capture the whole force (see Map 2).¹⁵

¹² H. M. M. Richards, "Lebanon County's emergency volunteers at Gettysburg," *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, III, No. 7 (August, 1905), 175.

¹³ Ray Shank, "Lebanon: its economic, political and social development between 1845-1865," *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, XII, No. 1 (January, 1943), 72.

¹⁴ Richards, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, III, No. 7, 180.

¹⁵ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 465.

The 26th Regiment, having been deployed to the right of the Chambersburg (Cashtown) Road, began to pitch tents and prepare for an indefinite stay. Meanwhile, Colonel Jennings and Major Robert Bell, commander of an emergency horse troop from Gettysburg, rode to the crest of a nearby hill. Looking down the pike, the two officers saw the advancing Confederate columns not more than three-quarters of a mile distant. Colonel Jennings wisely assumed that additional enemy forces were approaching Gettysburg on the other roads converging on the town. The danger of imminent encirclement being apparent to him, Colonel Jennings recognized that the only way to escape was to retreat beyond the Mummasburg Road before any Confederates advancing on it could arrive and block the retreat.¹⁶ Orders to "strike tents!" were given instantly and soon afterwards the command was ordered to "advance!" The withdrawal of the regiment was conducted in an easterly direction almost toward Gettysburg. Within moments the rear guard of the unit was engaged by a body of cavalry from one of White's battalions. In the brief encounter the Virginia horsemen all but routed the already retreating Union forces. The Confederates then proceeded into Gettysburg where they captured the regimental supply train.¹⁷

Upon gaining knowledge of the engagement with the Union force, and the subsequent retreat of the same, Early sent Colonel William H. French and his 17th Virginia Cavalry to pursue the fugitive militia. In the ensuing trackdown a number of prisoners were taken but otherwise the militia had broken from the proposed trap. In the day's engagement 175 men of the 26th Regiment were captured, but were later paroled.¹⁸

After a number of hours of forced march, the regiment reached a country crossroad leading toward Hunterstown, about five

¹⁶ Richards, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, III, No. 7, 180-183.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-183.

¹⁸ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 465.

miles northeast of Gettysburg. The regiment continued on this road until about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when it reached the farm of Henry Witmer, some four and one-half miles north of Gettysburg, and then halted. Suddenly, without warning, a body of Confederate cavalry charged the regiment and caused a melee during which many men were separated from their units. Private Stanley A. Ulrich of Company E, one of these unfortunates, was able to escape, however, and made his way to Gettysburg where he joined Company K, 121st Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, with which he fought throughout the entire battle.¹⁹

After a half hour's engagement, Colonel Jennings determined to continue the march, because every minute gave the pursuing infantry an opportunity to catch up.²⁰ The regiment promptly abandoned the roads and took a straight path across the hills and fields to the east. The tired and weary troops continued the trek through the fields all night and into the next day.²¹ At 10:00 A.M., Saturday, June 27, the regiment halted near Colonel Wofford's farm and there gained its first actual rest in more than twenty-four hours. The men again fell into ranks at 1:00 P.M. and started toward Harrisburg. After a brief encounter with the enemy at Dillsburg, the regiment continued its march and finally arrived at the state capital in the early afternoon of Sunday, June 28.²²

The troops of the 26th Emergency Regiment, a part of Pennsylvania's gallant sons, were the first to oppose the penetration of the Confederates into Pennsylvania and the first to draw blood in that historic event.

¹⁹ Richards, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, III, No. 7, 182-183.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 190-192.

Arrival of the Armies near Gettysburg

As the 26th Emergency Volunteers were retreating across the rain-soaked Pennsylvania countryside on June 27, General Ewell led his two remaining divisions, under Major Generals Robert E. Rodes and Edward Johnson, on an advance into Carlisle.²³ On the same day, the First and Third Corps, under Generals Longstreet and Hill, respectively, encamped in the vicinity of Chambersburg, a small town twenty miles to the west of Gettysburg. The former camped on the outskirts of Chambersburg and the latter in and around the small town of Fayetteville about five miles to the east.²⁴ The extent of the Confederate advance was now becoming critical.

Adhering to the orders of Lee to capture the bridge at Wrightsville, General Early sent Gordon's brigade toward York early on June 27. Later on the same day, Early moved in the same direction and camped for the night on the edge of Berlin, about five miles from York. On the morning of the next day, June 28, Early proceeded through Weigelstown and into York where he met Gordon and repeated to him the instructions to secure the Wrightsville-Columbia bridge. Gordon promptly advanced to Wrightsville where he became engaged with a troop of Pennsylvania militia. Within moments the militia was in full retreat through the town and across the bridge. In their excited flight across the wooden span, the militia set fire to it and, before the flames could be arrested, Wrightsville was soon aflame. It was only through the exertions of the Southern troops and a number of residents of the community that the fire was extinguished in time to save the town, but the bridge had been destroyed.²⁵

Lee received information from a scout on the evening of June 28 that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was ad-

²³ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 551.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 466.

vancing northward toward South Mountain. In the absence of the Confederate cavalry, it was impossible for Lee to ascertain the intentions of Hooker, and it now became necessary to prevent the Union army from advancing further west, a movement which would enable it to cut Southern communications with Virginia. The Southern commander decided to concentrate his forces east of the mountains around Cashtown. Accordingly, Lee dispatched to his corps commanders orders to assemble their various divisions around that town.²⁶

Early, with his plans entirely thwarted by the destruction of the bridge, returned on June 29 to York at which point he received from Lee orders to rejoin the other elements of the army in the west. On the following day, he moved from York by the way of Weigelstown and Berlin to within a few miles of Heidlersburg. At this time Early learned from Ewell, who was en route from Carlisle, that the plan of operations was to concentrate near Cashtown.²⁷

Meanwhile, Hooker, having crossed the Potomac on June 26, proceeded northward and on the next day arrived at Frederick, Maryland, where he stunned the country on June 28 by asking to be relieved of his command.²⁸ Major General Henry W. Halleck, general-in-chief of all the Union forces, promptly complied with Hooker's request.²⁹ Halleck immediately informed General Meade, then commander of the Fifth Corps.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 467-468.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, 60.

²⁹ The resignation of Hooker was due mainly to two reasons: (1) He considered his instructions to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington, along with keeping an eye on the army of Lee, out of the question because he believed that he did not have sufficient troops at his disposal, and (2) he disagreed with Halleck as to the importance of Harper's Ferry. Hooker thought that the 10,000-man garrison protecting the ferry was unnecessary; thus, when he asked Halleck for these troops and was refused, he resigned his command.

Army of the Potomac, that he was in command of the army.³⁰ After considering the situation, Meade, keeping both Washington and Baltimore covered, started north toward the Susquehanna River on June 29. On the same evening his army encamped in northern Maryland between Emmitsburg, approximately eight miles southwest of Gettysburg, and New Windsor, about eight miles southeast of Emmitsburg.³¹

The sudden appearance of the Union army on the field caused Lee to prepare for an engagement which he did not favor, particularly at this point. Until he had learned on June 28 of the Union movement across the Potomac, Lee had been uninformed regarding the location of the Northern forces. His "eyes," the Confederate cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, after guarding his advance up the Shenandoah, had swung far to the right of the Union army and had engaged in harassing its flanks and supply trains. This wide sweep and the resulting loss of contact with the headquarters of the Southern forces caused Lee to be without information for a week. The lack of vital information caused a complete change in the planning of the Southern commander. It was only on July 1 that Stuart restored contact and by then it was too late, for the battle had begun.³²

The Army of the Potomac again started northward in the early morning of June 30, but General Meade, after due consideration, decided to allow Lee to make the first move. Having made this decision, the Union commander selected Pipe Creek, a small winding stream running between Middleburg and Manchester, Maryland, as his defensive position. Not only was this position very advantageous to battle because of its terrain features,

³⁰ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 61. With this command, Meade received all the authority previously denied to Hooker and was given direct control of Harper's Ferry (*ibid.*).

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³² William C. Storrick, *The Battle of Gettysburg* (Harrisburg, 1946), p. 9.

but it was also very accessible to a rapid troop concentration. Meade's plan, however, was subject to change as circumstances might dictate.³³ By the afternoon of June 30, the Union general had moved his headquarters to Taneytown, Maryland, fifteen miles south of Gettysburg. His forces were scattered over the countryside from the vicinity of Emmitsburg on the left to Manchester on the right.³⁴ The left of the Union force, comprised of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, under Major General John F. Reynolds, was stationed in and around Emmitsburg.³⁵ The First Corps, under direct command of General Reynolds, was encamped along Marsh Creek about five miles south of Gettysburg.³⁶ The Third Corps, under Major General Daniel E. Sickles, was located near Bridgeport, Maryland, and the Eleventh Corps, under Major General Oliver O. Howard, was stationed at Emmitsburg. The center of the Union army, stationed in the vicinity of Taneytown, was composed of the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps. The Second Corps, under Major General Winfield S. Hancock, was encamped at Uniontown.³⁷ The Fifth Corps, under Major General George Sykes, was located at Union Mills, and the Twelfth Corps, under Major General Henry W. Slocum, was situated in Littlestown. The Sixth Corps, under Major General John Sedgwick, occupied the Union right and was located at Manchester.³⁸

Lee, as previously stated, had begun to concentrate his forces near Cashtown, selected because of its location at the base of the South Mountain. The Confederate general hoped to use the mountain as a defensive line to stop the advance of the forces of Meade.³⁹ As of June 30, the complete Confederate army, with

³³ Abner Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, campaigns of the Civil War* (13 vols.; New York, 1882), VI, 210.

³⁴ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 68.


³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

³⁸ Storrick, pp. 9-10.

³⁹ Tillberg, p. 6.



MAP 3

GETTYSBURG AND IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS

the exception of the 2nd Division of the First Corps, under Major General George S. Pickett, stationed at Chambersburg in order to guard the army rear, was approaching this location.⁴⁰ The Army of Northern Virginia was within a few miles of the fateful field by the evening of June 30. The First Corps, under Longstreet, was situated at Greenwood where Lee established his headquarters.⁴¹ The Second Corps, under Ewell, except for the 2nd Division, under General Johnson, located between Greenville and Scotland, was encamped near Heidlersburg.⁴² The Third Corps, under Hill, was stationed at Cashtown, except for the 1st Division, commanded by Major General Richard H. Anderson, which was located at Fayetteville.⁴³

Arrival of Buford's Division

General Meade, on June 30, ordered Major General John Buford, commander, 1st Division, Cavalry Corps, to conduct a reconnaissance to Gettysburg (see Map 3) with the first two brigades of his unit.⁴⁴ Company E, 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 2d Brigade, leading the column, was composed of men from Lebanon County and was the first unit of the Army of the Potomac to enter Gettysburg on the early afternoon of June 30.⁴⁵ Here the cavalry force met an advance brigade of Confederate infantry from Hill's corps, under Brigadier General James J. Pettigrew, ordered by Major General Henry Heth to the town to obtain shoes and any other available supplies. Pettigrew, not desiring to bring on an engagement, returned to Cashtown and informed Heth of his encounter.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 317.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 444.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 606-607.

⁴⁴ Tillberg, p. 6.

⁴⁵ Moyer, p. 49.

⁴⁶ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 637.

After examining the terrain thoroughly, Buford recognized the strategic advantages of the position he held and realized that every possible means of maintaining possession of the locality should be exhausted. From constant contacts with advance Southern units, Buford was almost certain that the battle would be fought in this vicinity. His one fear was that the infantry would not arrive in time.⁴⁷

Buford's 1st Brigade, under Colonel William Gamble, encamped for the night along Seminary Ridge to the left of the road to Cashtown. The 2d Brigade, under Colonel Thomas C. Devin, rested on the ridge to the right of the road.⁴⁸ The 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Josiah H. Kellogg, was stationed along the Mummasburg Road, with mounted sentinels posted beyond the pickets as far as the Forney buildings about one and one-half miles from Gettysburg.⁴⁹ Company E, under Captain William Tice, a native of Myerstown, along with two other companies from the 17th Regiment, held the picket line for the 2d Brigade on the night of June 30.⁵⁰

The stage was set on Tuesday evening, June 30. Neither Lee nor Meade foresaw Gettysburg as the field for the coming conflict. Each expected the other to take the initiative. The next day, July 1, would begin the life or death struggle of the Union.

⁴⁷ Moyer, p. 60.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

FIRST DAY'S BATTLE (JULY 1, 1863)

Initial Activities of Units Containing Lebanon County Men

Under orders from Hill, General Heth's and Major General William D. Pender's divisions left Cashtown at 5:00 A.M., Wednesday, July 1, and moved along the Cashtown Road toward Gettysburg in order to ascertain the strength of the Union force which Pettigrew had encountered the previous day.⁵¹ The Battle of Gettysburg began shortly before 7:00 A.M. when the 3rd and 4th Brigades of Heth's division, under Brigadier Generals James J. Archer and Joseph R. Davis, respectively, encountered the advance units of the 1st Brigade of Buford's cavalry on the hills west of Gettysburg.⁵² Meanwhile, the troops of General Rodes' division, Ewell's corps, were approaching from the north and, soon after the engagement began on the Union left, the 2nd Brigade of Union cavalry was engaged on the right.⁵³ Word was immediately sent to General Reynolds, commanding the Union left wing, who, by 8:00 A.M., dispatched the 1st Division of the First Corps, under Brigadier General James S. Wadsworth, from Marsh Creek across the fields toward the Cashtown Road.⁵⁴ While Reynolds and the remainder of the Union army were on their way to Gettysburg, the cavalry, under General Buford, sustained the brunt of the Confederate advance. His forces, numbering between 3,000 and 4,000, held an unbroken line of almost four miles from the Harrisburg Road to the Hagerstown Road until relieved by Union infantry (see Map 4).⁵⁵


⁵¹ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 607.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 637.

⁵³ Moyer, p. 61.

⁵⁴ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 265.

⁵⁵ Moyer, p. 62.



MAP 4

MOVEMENTS OF 17TH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,
JULY 1

When the battle had been begun in the early hours of July 1, the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry was formed on Seminary Ridge to the left of the Mummasburg Road within a short distance of its campsite of the previous night.⁵⁶ Early in the morning, however, Company E, composed of men from Lebanon County, was moved to the left to guard Battery A, 2nd U.S. Artillery, under Second Lieutenant John H. Calef.⁵⁷ The company acted as a support force for the middle section of the battery, situated on the Cashtown Road, a short distance to the west of Seminary Ridge. Gradually the enemy advanced and the battery was forced back until it reached the crest of Seminary Ridge. Here the battery, with the aid of the carbineers of Company E, the only remaining support element, fought off the Southern attack until it was finally relieved by the troops of Wadsworth's division shortly after 10:00 A.M. Company E rejoined its regiment, which had withdrawn to the Harrisburg Pike to aid the hard-pressed right wing of the cavalry.⁵⁸

By the time Wadsworth had arrived, General Reynolds had already galloped to the field and, after conferring with Buford, had formulated an incomplete but firm plan of action. Simply stated, it was the intention of Reynolds to defend the Cashtown and Fairfield Roads and hold the woods between them. He directed his line of battle to be formed on what is today known as McPherson's Ridge, about six hundred feet east of Willoughby Run. At the same time, Reynolds gave orders to Major General Abner Doubleday, previously in command of the 3rd Division, First Corps, now the commander of that corps, and later the inventor of the great American pastime, baseball, to cover the Union left. Reynolds, with his troops at hand, advanced to the front, where he helped to form along the Cashtown Road his right wing composed of regiments of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, under Brigadier General Lysander Cutler. Doubleday

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.


placed the 1st Brigade, otherwise known as the "Iron Brigade," under Brigadier General Solomon Meredith, on the left in the vicinity of McPherson's Grove, later known as Reynold's Grove. After placing Cutler's brigade in position, General Reynolds, as far as can be determined, rode to the left to assist in the establishment of the left flank. At approximately 10:15 A.M., as Reynolds was passing through McPherson's Grove, he was shot through the back of the head and fell mortally wounded.⁵⁹ The death of General Reynolds delivered a severe shock to the Union forces; his ability and bravery were well noted; the Union had lost a capable and well-loved officer.

The remainder of the First Corps, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, under Brigadier Generals John C. Robinson and Thomas A. Rowley, respectively, arrived on the field about 11:00 A.M. Robinson's division was placed in reserve near the Lutheran Theological Seminary, located on Seminary Ridge, equidistant from the Cashtown and Fairfield Roads. Rowley's division was divided, the 2nd Brigade, under Colonel Roy Stone, being posted between the two brigades of Wadsworth's division, with its right on the Chambersburg (Cashtown) Road and its left near McPherson's Grove. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Chapman Biddle, was positioned to the left and rear of the "Iron Brigade" toward the Fairfield Road.⁶⁰

Lebanon County had three companies in three separate regiments in three different brigades of the First Corps: Company I, 107th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1st Brigade, 2nd Division; Company K, 142nd Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1st Brigade, 3rd Division; Company C, 149th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division (see Map 5).

⁵⁹ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 244-245.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 247.



MAP 5

LEBANON COUNTY UNITS, JULY 1

Almost as soon as Robinson's division arrived at its reserve post, orders were issued to Brigadier General Henry Baxter, commanding the 2nd Brigade, to advance to the Union right flank which was then being threatened. The 1st Brigade, under Brigadier General Gabriel R. Paul, was set to work entrenching the section of Seminary Ridge on which it was located.⁶¹ Company I, 107th Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Captain William N. Black, assisted in digging trenches and erecting rail and stone barricades. These defenses became very advantageous when the First Corps was compelled to retreat in the late afternoon.⁶²

Company K, 142nd Regiment, commanded by First Lieutenant Jeremiah Hoffman, from Lebanon County, having advanced to the front line, deployed in a field to the left of McPherson's Grove and faced west. The regiment constituted the right flank of the brigade a few hundred feet from the left flank of the "Iron Brigade."⁶³ Here the brigade remained, facing the ever-increasing columns advancing from the west. Between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M., the enemy began advancing on the Union left held by the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Division. The brigade had to change position a number of times in order to shelter itself from the heavy enfilading fire it was receiving on its flanks. Gradually, the Confederates, by force of numbers, began flanking the already exposed and under-manned Union left. The Southerners, having turned the Union left, began pouring a direct and oblique fire into the depleted ranks of the 1st Brigade. The men continued to hold the line until about 4:00 P.M., when, finally, they were compelled to retire to the cover of the barricades erected earlier in the morning on Seminary Ridge.⁶⁴ At these breastworks, Colonel Biddle, the

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁶² John P. Nicholson (ed.), *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg; ceremonies at the dedication of the monuments* (2 vols.; Harrisburg, 1904), I, 560.

⁶³ Samuel P. Bates, *History of Pennsylvania volunteers, 1861-5* (5 vols.; Harrisburg, 1869-1871), IV, 466.

⁶⁴ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 315.

brigade commander, was wounded in the head by a shot and Colonel Theodore B. Gates of the 80th New York Infantry became the commander of the brigade.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, as soon as it had arrived at the front, Baxter's 2nd Brigade had become hotly engaged with the enemy. Seeing the position of the brigade seriously threatened, General Robinson, commanding the division, brought up the 1st Brigade as a support force.⁶⁶ The 107th Pennsylvania Volunteers, with its Lebanon contingent, along with the remainder of the brigade, arrived at the front lines about 1:00 P.M.⁶⁷ The 107th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James MacThompson, took a position, facing west, behind a stone wall on the crest of Seminary Ridge north of a railroad cut. Almost immediately it was engaged by charging Confederate columns moving toward the stone wall.⁶⁸ These columns were composed of men from Brigadier General Alfred Iverson's brigade, Rodes' division, Ewell's corps.⁶⁹

Attack after attack was made upon the Union line but each was repulsed. In one of the first of these attacks, General Paul was wounded and the command of the brigade passed into the hands of Colonel Samuel H. Leonard, then the commander of the 13th Massachusetts Volunteers.⁷⁰ Suddenly, after many repeated attacks, the 107th Regiment assaulted the Southern line, pushed it back, and captured a number of prisoners. But before long the superior forces turned the brilliant movement and caused its retreat back up the ridge. It was about this time that the regiment lost the services of one of its staff officers, Major Henry J. Sheaffer, a Lebanonian, who was severely wounded by a Confederate shell.⁷¹

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁶⁸ Bates, III, 860.

⁶⁹ John H. Stine, *History of Army of the Potomac* (Washington, 1893), p. 474.

⁷⁰ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 290.

⁷¹ Bates, III, 860.

The fighting continued into the late afternoon with heavy losses incurred on both sides. Through constant enemy reinforcement, the tired and bloodied First Corps was finally outflanked and overborne. Shortly thereafter orders were received to withdraw.⁷²

In the interim, as mentioned previously, Stone's 2nd Brigade had been placed between the two brigades of Wadsworth's division along the Chambersburg Road. This brigade was composed of three Pennsylvania volunteer regiments known as the Bucktails: the 143rd Regiment, the 149th Regiment, and the 150th Regiment. Company C, 149th Regiment, under Captain John H. Bassler, was from Lebanon County.

The position held by Stone's brigade was the key point in the Union line of battle on July 1. The brigade arrived on the field about 11:00 A.M. and went into line on McPherson's Ridge facing west (see Map 6). The 150th Regiment, forming the left flank, assumed a position extending from the left of the McPherson Farm almost to McPherson's Grove. The 143rd Regiment, occupying the center, posted itself within the farm area behind whatever shelter it could find.⁷³ The 149th Regiment, constituting the right flank of the brigade, positioned itself along the McPherson lane with its extreme right aligned along the Chambersburg Road facing north.⁷⁴ The troops had occupied these positions for almost two hours when a battery on the extreme right of the brigade opened a very destructive enfilading fire on the unit's unprotected flank.⁷⁵ Although the brigade had been under constant fire from the forces advancing from the west, the low ridge did afford some shelter; but, when the posi-

⁷² Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 290.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

⁷⁴ J[ohn] H. Bassler, "The color episode of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, in the first day's fight at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863," *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, IV, No. 4 (October, 1907), 86.

⁷⁵ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 329.

tion became enfiladed from the north, it now became extremely hazardous to hold. About 1:00 P.M., Colonel Stone, realizing that his position was seriously threatened but, at the same time, knowing that its maintenance was all the more important, swung the remaining portion of the 149th Regiment into the shelter of a ditch on the southern edge of the pike. Shortly thereafter, the 143rd Regiment was sent to the right of the 149th. Thus the line formed a right angle facing north and west. The two regiments were now safe from the battery to the north, but, unfortunately, the movement was detected from the west and the Southerners promptly commenced throwing shells into the new location.⁷⁶

While Stone had been realigning his forces along the Chambersburg Road, the Eleventh Corps, commanded by General Howard, arrived on the scene. Howard immediately ordered the 1st and 3rd Divisions, under Brigadier Generals Francis C. Barlow and Carl Schurz, respectively, to the line of battle to the right of the First Corps, forming a right angle with its vertex close to the Mummasburg Road and extending to the Harrisburg Road. The 2nd Division, under Brigadier General Adolph W. von Steinwehr, was held in reserve on Cemetery Hill.⁷⁷


The Color Episode

In the meantime, Colonel Stone had conceived the idea of using the 149th's state and national colors to draw fire away from the two regiments in the ditch, which location was becoming untenable.⁷⁸ At the same time, Stone, from his elevated position, was able to observe the developing enemy formation to the northwest over a scene of at least two miles. As far as the eye could see, Confederate troops were advancing toward the Union lines.

⁷⁶ Bassler, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, IV, No. 4, 87.

⁷⁷ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 702.

⁷⁸ Bassler, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, IV, No. 4, 87.



MAP 6

COLOR EPISODE

Stone's plan was now twofold. First, he would endeavor to deceive the enemy by advancing the 149th Regiment to the railroad cut about five hundred feet north of and parallel to the pike, and, while en route, the unit would place its colors in such a position as to draw the enemy fire from the ditch toward the standards. Secondly, the railroad cut, which was very deep along this particular stretch of land, would offer a fairly defensible position for the regiment, and if, as would eventually happen, it should be necessary for the line to fall back, the cut would act as a barrier to the advance of the Confederates and allow for much needed time (see Map 6).

Colonel Stone, about 1:30 P.M., ordered the 149th Regiment to move forward to the railroad cut. At the same time orders were given to Color Sergeant Henry G. Brehm of the color company, Company C from Lebanon County, to place the colors of the regiment at a predetermined point between the pike and the cut. Accordingly, Sergeant Brehm, a native of Myerstown, and the color guards, Corporals John Friddell and Franklin W. Lehman, also of Myerstown, Privates John H. Hammel and Henry H. Spayd, who lived on farms in the vicinity of Myerstown, and Private Frederick Hoffman of Newmanstown, trudged across the Chambersburg Road and advanced in a northwesterly direction to a point about fifty yards north of the pike. Here the group planted the regimental standards behind a rail pile which formed a right angle facing both north and west (see Map 6).⁷⁹

While the colors were being advanced, the regiment moved to the bluffs of the railroad cut, where the troops lay in wait for the Confederates. Thus the colors were located to the left of the regiment which was situated on the southern side of the cut. The flags were now visible to the enemy batteries which had been

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

causing havoc to the line along the pike. As a result, the Confederates, thinking the flags represented a change in fronts, began diverting some of their fire toward the lightly defended standards. Stone's plan had worked.⁸⁰

It was almost 2:00 P.M. Along the whole front the Confederates were starting their grand advance. Elements of the brigade commanded by General Iverson were already engaged by men of the 107th Regiment on Seminary Ridge. As Iverson's forces moved toward the Union front, his troops formed a line which became almost perpendicular to the railroad cut, and, as a result, his right flank drew heavy fire from the troops located at that spot.⁸¹ Iverson, seeing his right flank threatened, requested support from Brigadier General Junius Daniel⁸² who immediately moved his entire brigade, with the exception of the 2nd North Carolina Battalion and the 45th North Carolina Regiment, by the left flank. Shortly thereafter, the 2nd Battalion and the 45th Regiment, covering Daniel's right flank, moved forward toward the railroad cut.⁸³ The 149th Regiment was now ordered across the cut to its northern slope where it prepared to meet the advancing North Carolinians.⁸⁴

The two North Carolina units slowly advanced toward the Union line. When they reached a rail fence about eighty-five yards from the cut, they encountered a staggering volley from the Bucktails posted there. After regrouping, the Confederates crossed the fence and marched up the gentle slope toward the Union line. Again they were reeled by a volley of fire, and immediately the 149th Pennsylvania Volunteers charged the stunned men and pushed them back across the fence in utter confusion.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

⁸¹ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 566.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 579.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 566.

⁸⁴ Bassler, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, IV, No. 4, 88.

⁸⁵ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 330.

Finally, after a number of charges and countercharges by each side, General Daniel ordered Colonel E. C. Brabble to move his 32nd North Carolina Regiment across the railroad bed west of the cut, to advance on the Union lines from the west, and to take up a position where he could reach the flank of the enemy at the McPherson Farm at the proper time.⁸⁶ In the process of fulfilling these orders, Brabble's guns enfiladed the railroad cut, thus forcing the withdrawal of the 149th Regiment toward the pike.⁸⁷ As the regiment was falling back toward its original line, Colonel Stone and Captain Bassler were severely wounded. Colonel Stone was removed from the field, while Captain Bassler was carried to the McPherson Farm and placed in the south-eastern corner of the barnyard where he remained until July 5 when he was evacuated.⁸⁸ From his vantage point he was able to witness the battle as it passed heading east toward Cemetery Ridge. With the loss of Stone, the command of the brigade passed to Colonel Langhorne Wister, commander of the 150th Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Having forced the Union elements from the cut, Colonel Brabble's command started to advance obliquely through the wheat field toward the Union line, supposedly at the top of the hill where the colors stood. Seeing the advancing regiment, Colonel Wister divided the 150th Pennsylvania Volunteers into two wings — the right under Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Huidekoper, the left under Major Thomas Chamberlain. The right wing, composed of Companies A, F and D, was thrown forward in line with the 143rd and 149th Regiments along the pike. The left remained in position facing west. When the forces under Brabble had advanced the appropriate distance through the wheat field, Wister hurled the three companies against the approaching Confederate line. The surprise of the attack com-

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, 566.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

⁸⁸ Bassler, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, IV, No. 4, 91.

pletely startled the enemy so that their line was routed and forced to fall back to the railroad bed.⁸⁹ Shortly thereafter Colonel Wister was wounded and the command passed to Colonel Edmund L. Dana of the 143rd Pennsylvania Volunteers. If Sergeant Brehm and his men had fled upon seeing the approaching Confederates, the deception which the flags had thus far cast upon the enemy would have been at an end.

By this time it was 3:00 P.M. and the Southerners were still withholding an all-out attack at this particular point in the Union line. It was apparent that the colors had influenced the Confederate inactivity. There is no doubt that after Brabble's setback the Southerners were deceived by the standards and, not knowing what they might meet, they were now very skeptical about advancing up the wheat field. Moreover, General Davis, who commanded the left wing of the advance of Heth's division, having already been engaged severely and with the troops of his 4th Brigade being exhausted, was very much aware of the flags on the commanding slope just to his front. Therefore, he was also forced to wait. It was only after the Confederate line had advanced a considerable distance on the right that the forces under Davis began to move. It was one of his men who eventually captured the state flag of the 149th Regiment. From the north the colors were protected by the railroad cut which, because of its abrupt sides, was impassable and, hence, kept Daniel's brigade from advancing any further. In fact, this brigade, with the exception of Brabble's regiment, was held at the cut until July 2.

The standards had been in position for almost two hours when the Confederate battle line, forming a semicircle, slowly began enveloping the men of the Bucktail Brigade. By 3:15 P.M. the unit was outflanked on its left and forced to retreat from its position at the McPherson Farm by two Confederate brigades under Colonels John M. Brockenbrough and Alfred M. Scales.

⁸⁹ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 332.

The 149th and 150th Regiments fell back to the left of the 143rd Pennsylvania Volunteers which was now facing west about one hundred yards east of the McPherson buildings.⁹⁰

The Confederate line had now advanced as far east as the McPherson lane. In the meantime, Sergeant Brehm and his small group had become very much aware of their odd position; therefore, it was decided that Private Hoffman should make his way to the original line and ask permission for the color squad to return.⁹¹ Before he could accomplish his mission, however, Stone's troops were already being forced from their position on the McPherson Farm and the only thing that Hoffman could do was to follow, since it was useless to attempt to return to his comrades.⁹²

By this time it was evident that the men in the brigade commanded by Davis were observing the colors and, when the Confederate line of battle passed to the south of the flags, it seemed strange that the regiment, which was imagined to be on the hill, did not attack the flank of the Southern forces. Therefore, a half dozen men of the 42nd Mississippi Regiment and their sergeant, Frank Price, decided to investigate the mystery. Slowly, on hands and knees, the small group crept up the wheat-covered slope toward the colors. After advancing to within a few feet of the rail pile and discerning no evident activity, the rebels suddenly rose to their feet and charged the breastwork, at the same time emitting a fierce yell which thoroughly startled the color guard. The yell saved the Union soldiers for, if they had not been aroused, there is every reason to believe that they would have all been captured or killed on the spot.

⁹⁰ Bassler, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, IV, No. 4, 90-91.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

In the hand to hand struggle which ensued, six of the Southerners were struck down; the other, Sergeant Price, was momentarily stunned as he grasped for the national flag and was thrown to the earth by Sergeant Brehm.⁹³ The brief encounter was over in a few seconds and the color guard was sprinting in the direction of the Union lines which were no longer intact. Corporal Friddell and Private Hammel were both wounded while attempting to divert fire from Brehm who, heading in a southeasterly direction with the national flag in hand, had just dashed past the Southern line.⁹⁴ Corporal Lehman, after dashing south and seeing only men in gray, ran eastward and managed to get a short distance beyond the Southern left flank before he was shot.⁹⁵

Private Spayd, having possession of the state standard, also had to change his course in a more easterly direction as he ran for his life. He was brought down by a shot from Sergeant Price who by now had recovered from his fight with Brehm. Although Spayd tried to cover the flag with his body, Price was not deceived and almost immediately extracted the state flag from beneath the body of the private and returned to his own lines with the coveted prize.⁹⁶

Meanwhile Sergeant Brehm, having gotten by the Southern line, was now running across the meadow east of the McPherson Farm. Captain Bassler, from his position in the barnyard, was able to witness the color sergeant as he passed by the farm in his wild dash.⁹⁷ Others were also observing this gallant run; unfortunately for Brehm, however, these other witnesses were Southerners, men of Brockenbrough's Virginia brigade, and, before he could reach safety, Brehm was hit and dropped. Although able to walk to the rear as a prisoner, Color Sergeant Brehm died five

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

weeks later in a Philadelphia hospital.⁹⁸ The national flag, which Brehm so gallantly had endeavored to defend, was recovered by his captor, Private J. T. Lumpkin, Company C, 55th Virginia Regiment.⁹⁹

The colors had been lost, but the time gained was invaluable. Colonel Nicholson of the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission later stated to Colonel Stone that every minute gained at this point in the battle was worth a regiment.¹⁰⁰ The actual number of Confederate troops held inactive, from the spell cast by the standards, will never be known, but it is certain that two brigades, those of Daniel and Davis, numbering about 5,000 men, were in constant awareness of the colors.

How many other Southern troops were affected by the colors, as stated before, will never be known, but a good estimate of the total number is at least 10,000. It was only after the Union left flank was turned that an all-out assault was made on Stone's brigade. It is easy to see that the Confederate line of assault was, at this point of the battle, indirect in that it would not strike the front of Stone's brigade until an advantage had been gained, and this advantage came when the Union left flank was turned. According to all the rules of strategy, advancing in a frontal attack was not tactically sound if the line was subject to a flank attack by the enemy, and the colors represented such a threat to the Confederate line.

Retreat to Cemetery Ridge

The enemy now began its final effort of the day and a general Union withdrawal was in effect along the whole front by 4:00 P.M., by which hour almost two-thirds of Lee's army had arrived

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

on the field. The Eleventh Corps was already pouring through the streets of Gettysburg in retreat, with its right wing being covered by the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, including, of course, Company E from Lebanon County. The 17th Regiment went into position on Cemetery Hill, on the ground now occupied by the National Cemetery, where it remained until late evening when, with orders to protect the Union left flank, it moved south on the Emmitsburg Road to the Peach Orchard.¹⁰¹

In conjunction with the retreat of the Eleventh Corps, elements of the First Corps also began to retire. When the two brigades, under Generals Meredith and Biddle, controlling the Union left flank were overrun, the whole line of the First Corps began to withdraw. The 142nd Regiment, containing Company K from Lebanon County, already having fallen back to the breastworks on Seminary Ridge, became hotly engaged with its pursuers who were close on the heels of the retreating force. After fighting until about 4:20 P.M., the regiment was finally compelled to retire.¹⁰² In withdrawing through the town, the 142nd Pennsylvania Volunteers met a confused mass of troops from many other units also in full retreat. After passing through the town, under incessant fire, the regiment was posted along the Taneytown Road west of the Evergreen Cemetery. Here the unit remained until 11 A.M. on the next day when it was relieved.¹⁰³

The 107th Regiment, of which Company I was from Lebanon County, also overcome by superior numbers, was forced to withdraw through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill. After regrouping, the regiment moved to the Bryan House, located some 1,500 feet southwest of the cemetery, hurriedly threw up a breastwork, and camped for the night.¹⁰⁴ What was left of Stone's brigade re-

¹⁰¹ Moyer, pp. 63-64.

¹⁰² Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 328.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

¹⁰⁴ Bates, III, 861.

mained in position until Meredith's retreat on the left had been ascertained and then slowly retired toward Seminary Ridge, occasionally making stands.¹⁰⁵ In one of the first of these stands, Second Lieutenant John G. Batdorf of Company C, 149th Pennsylvania Volunteers, was captured. As the brigade line withdrew, it passed through a peach orchard, north of and adjacent to the Chambersburg Road, from which point the Bucktails fell back to the railroad bed which they followed into Gettysburg. The troops then passed through the town which was now occupied by the advance troops of Ewell's corps. What remained of the depleted ranks of the brigade, the last organized body of troops to leave the field, moved to Cemetery Hill. The 149th Regiment, along with remnants of the two other Bucktail Regiments, regrouped and went into position on the northern slope of the hill behind a stone wall facing the town.¹⁰⁶ At this point the 149th Regiment, having lost seventeen of its commissioned officers, including its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Walton Dwight, was placed under Captain James Glenn of Company D who commanded the regiment until July 6.¹⁰⁷

The first day of the battle had ended. The heroic stand of a gallant Union force numbering about 20,000 men, small in number when compared to the vastly superior forces of a concentrated attacking army of approximately 55,000, saved the Battle of Gettysburg from becoming a Confederate victory. The stubborn defense by Buford's 4,000 cavalrymen for almost four hours frustrated the advance columns of Hill's corps and prevented them from reaching Gettysburg and occupying the heights south of town. To this band of horsemen and to the First Corps, especially the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division, can be attributed the Union victory which eventually was won. Stone's brigade suffered more casualties on July 1, in proportion to the number of men engaged, than Pickett was to lose two days later: two-thirds

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 612.

¹⁰⁶ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 336.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

of the command fell or were captured, while Pickett lost only one-half of his forces. Except for some minor skirmishes between opposing pickets later in the day, the first day of battle had ended. The slaughter was great on both sides. For the number of troops involved, July 1 can be considered the bloodiest of the three days at Gettysburg.

To Company C, 149th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, composed entirely of Lebanon County men, should go the highest praise. This unit of eighty-two men, in connection with the color episode, held off an unknown number of Southern troops. The color incident stands out as one of the most dramatic scenes in the entire Battle of Gettysburg.

The Union Army had adopted its famous defense line from Culp's Hill to Big Round Top by the late evening of July 1. The weary troops now rested and prepared for the day ahead, not knowing what the dawn would bring. The remaining troops of both armies marched toward Gettysburg throughout the night. Lee had arrived late in the afternoon of July 1, and Meade appeared at 1:00 P.M. on the following day.¹⁰⁸

Thursday morning, July 2, dawned as the sun cast its first rays across the fields of ripening crops. Already the stage was being set for the magnificent drama that soon was to follow.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

SECOND DAY'S BATTLE (JULY 2, 1863)

Union and Confederate Lines of Battle

With the exception of a few regiments held in reserve, six of the seven corps comprising the Army of the Potomac had arrived on the field by 8:00 A.M. on Thursday, July 2. The Sixth Corps would arrive later that afternoon (see Map 7).

The Union line of battle on Cemetery Ridge and adjacent heights, from right flank to left flank, was as follows: The Twelfth Corps, commanded by General Slocum, formed the right flank of the line from Rock Creek, by way of Spangler's Spring, to Culp's Hill; the line from Culp's Hill across Cemetery Hill to Cemetery Ridge was held by the First and Eleventh Corps, under the command of Major Generals John Newton¹⁰⁹ and Oliver O. Howard; to the left of the Eleventh Corps lay the Second Corps, under command of General Hancock; occupying the extreme left of the Union line was the Third Corps, under General Sickles. The Fifth Corps, commanded by General Sykes, pending the arrival of the Sixth Corps, was held in reserve behind the Twelfth Corps.¹¹⁰ The Union line, in the shape of a fishhook, was about three miles in length; on the other hand, the Confederate line was nearly the same shape as that of Meade but, being the outer line, was about six miles long.

The Southern line, as of 8:00 A.M., extended northward along Seminary Ridge, then eastward through Gettysburg to Benner's Hill just east of Rock Creek. Forming the right flank of the

¹⁰⁹ General Newton assumed command on July 2 by order of Meade. Doubleday returned to the command of the 3rd Division, First Corps.

¹¹⁰ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 115-116.

Confederate line and facing the left flank of the Union line were two divisions of Longstreet's First Corps, under Major Generals John B. Hood and Lafayette McLaws. To the left of McLaws' division were located two divisions of Hill's Third Corps, under Generals Anderson and Pender. On the left of Pender's division, extending through the town, were the three divisions of Ewell's Second Corps, under the command of Generals Rodes, Early, and Johnson, the last unit reaching to Benner's Hill. Heth's division was held in reserve behind Pender and Anderson. Pickett's division was scheduled to arrive in the late afternoon.¹¹¹

Plan of Lee for the Second Day

Simply stated, Lee's plan for the second day of battle was to attack both flanks of the Union line at the same time and then strike the center to prevent reinforcements from being dispatched to either wing.¹¹² The principal attack, however, would be on the Union left flank. It was thought that the gain of the high ground there would enable artillery to be placed on the heights and thus to threaten the whole Union line on Cemetery Ridge.¹¹³

Originally it was planned that Longstreet and Ewell would strike the flanks at an early hour in a simultaneous effort; however, neither assault came about until late in the afternoon and, even then, the attack by Ewell did not coincide with that on the right. In fact, Ewell's advance was made after the assault by Longstreet had ended.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Storrick, p. 24.

¹¹² This attack on the Union center, as a feint to draw Union forces from the flanks, succeeded to a degree in that it pierced the Union line at one point, but it was immediately repulsed. This momentary success, however, gave Lee reason to believe that the Union center was weak and he used this conclusion to formulate his plan for the next day.

¹¹³ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 318.

¹¹⁴ Storrick, p. 30.

Early Activities of Units Containing Lebanon County Men


The 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, stationed along the Emmitsburg Road, engaged the Confederate infantry in the vicinity of the Peach Orchard about 9:00 A.M. After charging the rebels a number of times and being repulsed each time, the regiment withdrew to the Union left flank where it received orders from Pleasonton, who had been promoted to major general on June 22, to withdraw to Westminster, Maryland, the Union base of supply, in order to refit and rest. Early in the afternoon the entire 1st Division of Buford's cavalry was withdrawn from the field toward Westminster (see Map 1).¹¹⁵

The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, Third Corps, under the command of Colonel George C. Burling, arrived on the field at 9:00 A.M. from Emmitsburg, where it had been guarding the Hagerstown Road, while the remaining brigades of the Third Corps had advanced previously toward Gettysburg. A number of men in Companies D and G of the 3rd Brigade's 115th Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Major John P. Dunne, were from Lebanon County. The regiment went into position along Cemetery Ridge, just north of Little Round Top, until about noon when it was ordered by Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphreys, commanding the 2nd Division, to march to the left and report to Major General David B. Birney, commanding the 1st Division. Having done this, the brigade was placed in a section of woods, extending from the western slope of Big Round Top, in the rear of Birney's division.¹¹⁶

Before the arrival of the 115th Regiment, General Birney had ordered the 1st and 2nd U. S. Sharpshooters, commanded by Colonel Hiram Berdan, and the 3rd Maine Volunteers, command-

¹¹⁵ Moyer, p. 51.

¹¹⁶ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 570.



MAP 7

LEBANON COUNTY UNITS, JULY 2

ed by Colonel Moses B. Lakeman, to advance across the Emmitsburg Road and reconnoiter the enemy beyond the Pitzer Woods. Advancing into the woods, the Federal units were strongly engaged by an overwhelming force of rebel troops. The Union elements were compelled to retire and, by 2:00 P.M., had returned to the original line. Colonel Berdan at once reported to General Birney the result of his discovery.¹¹⁷

The position of the Confederate line meant to General Sickles that his left flank was endangered. At once, in accordance with the freshly received information, he began to move his line forward and, by 3:30 P.M., his front extended from Devil's Den on the left northwestward across the Wheat Field to the Peach Orchard and then northward to the Emmitsburg Road.¹¹⁸ The 115th Regiment, accordingly, was moved forward and posted behind a low stone fence along a wooded rise just southeast of the Wheat Field.¹¹⁹

In the meantime, the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William E. Doster, attached to the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps, under the command of Colonel John Irvin Gregg, had arrived on the field from Hanover and, by 11:00 A.M., had taken a position along the Hanover Road in close proximity to the Confederate left flank. Company F of the 4th Regiment, commanded by Captain William K. Lineweaver had been recruited in Lebanon County. At noon the regiment was ordered to report to General Pleasonton's corps headquarters.¹²⁰ Upon the arrival of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Pleasonton immediately issued orders for the regiment to guard the Union batteries on Cemetery Ridge in the vicinity of the George Weikert Farm. The regiment remained in this

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

¹¹⁸ Tillberg, p. 14.

¹¹⁹ Bates, III, 1211.

¹²⁰ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 1058-1059.

position until 9:00 P.M., when it was sent to the left of the corps headquarters to serve as pickets. Here the regiment camped for the remainder of the night.¹²¹

Arriving with Gregg's 3rd Brigade had been the 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel John B. McIntosh. Both brigades were under the command of Brigadier General David M. Gregg, the divisional commander. Attached to the 1st Brigade was Battery H, 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, a Lebanon unit, organized and commanded by Captain William D. Rank. The battery, ordinarily serving as heavy artillery at Baltimore, acted as light or horse artillery at Gettysburg. The unit was placed along the Hanover Road facing Gettysburg so as to protect the cavalry position. In the early afternoon, the battery engaged a number of Confederate troops advancing down the pike, but, after a brief skirmish, the rebels withdrew. The battery was then retired to the rear of Cemetery Ridge where it stayed until the next day.¹²²

Meanwhile, General Sedgwick and the Sixth Corps had trudged toward Gettysburg from Manchester. The corps, numbering about 18,000 men, was the largest in the Union army and its presence at Gettysburg would soon be felt. With the 93rd Pennsylvania Volunteers (Lebanon Infantry) heading the column, the corps crossed the state boundary at 10:00 A.M., continued northward at a steady pace, and arrived on the field at 2:00 P.M. after a forced march of thirty-seven miles in only seventeen hours.¹²³ The Sixth Corps went into position, as a reserve unit, behind the Union left flank then being held by the Third Corps.¹²⁴

The 93rd Regiment, commanded by Major John I. Nevin, was attached to the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, commanded by Brigadier General Frank Wheaton. In addition to its Lebanon recruits,

¹²¹ Nicholson, II, 831-832.

¹²² Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 956.

¹²³ Nicholson, I, 505.

¹²⁴ Bates, III, 288.

the regiment also contained men from Berks, Montour, Dauphin, Clinton, and Centre Counties. The majority, however, came from Lebanon County, including five companies composed entirely of Lebanon County men: Company A (Perseverance Company No. 1) commanded by Captain Jacob P. Embich; Company C (Quittapahilla Guards) commanded by Captain Richard G. Rogers; Company D (Union Guards) commanded by Captain Amos K. Kuhn; Company F (Perseverance Company No. 2) commanded by Captain John S. Long; Company K (Annville Guards) commanded by Captain David C. Keller.¹²⁵

The other Lebanon units were held, relatively speaking, inactive on this day. Except for two minor incidents, the 107th, 142nd, and 149th Regiments were acting as reserves on July 2.

The 107th Regiment was relieved of its position at the Bryan House in the early afternoon by the 3rd Division, Second Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Alexander Hays. It was then moved to the right rear of the Union line behind Cemetery Hill where it acted as a support force for the batteries in that vicinity. The regiment lay at this point until 6:30 P.M. at which time it was summoned to move to the left to support the line near Little Round Top. The enemy being checked, the regiment returned to its position behind Cemetery Hill where it bivouacked for the remainder of the night. In the day's engagement the regiment received four casualties, all wounded, none seriously.¹²⁶

The 142nd Regiment stayed in its position along the Taneytown Road until early evening when it was moved across the road to the protection of a stone fence about 750 feet southeast of the road. The regiment was not engaged at all on July 2. The unit remained

¹²⁵ Shank, *Papers read before the Lebanon County Historical Society*, XII, No. 1, 65.

¹²⁶ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 305.

at this point until 11:00 A.M. on the next day when it was moved forward.¹²⁷

The 149th remained in its position on Cemetery Hill until late afternoon when the whole brigade was called to the left about one-half mile to reinforce part of the line held by Hancock's Second Corps, then being threatened by Lee's central thrust. Later that evening, the 149th and 150th, commanded by Captains James Glenn and George W. Jones, both new commanders, were ordered to move in front of the Union line as far as the enemy picket line. The units thus advanced about six hundred yards west of the Union front and went into positions just to the left of the Cordon buildings near the Emmitsburg Road where the regiments remained until early the next morning when they returned to Cemetery Ridge. In withdrawing, the force retrieved two pieces of artillery and accompanying caissons which were pulled back to the Union front and employed on the afternoon of July 3.¹²⁸

Attack of Longstreet on the Union Left Flank

General Longstreet began his attack on the Union left flank at 4:00 P.M. His two divisions, under McLaws and Hood, advanced against the Third Corps. Slowly, but effectively, the Confederate line advanced and gradually pushed back the Union line.¹²⁹ The 115th Regiment, containing Lebanon County men, behind its protective wall at the stone fence, held the troops it faced at bay for a brief period but was finally forced to abandon its position for sheer lack of numbers against the Confederate strength. Finally, the regiment was relieved by the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, Second Corps, under the command of Colonel Edward E. Cross, but, before it had retired, the regiment

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, 358.

charged the Confederates and managed to push them into the woods to the left of their original line. While conducting its withdrawal, the 115th Regiment aided a hotly engaged battery and enabled it to be removed. The unit then rejoined its brigade and was withdrawn behind the line near Little Round Top where it lay in readiness until daylight of July 3.¹³⁰

In the meantime, the Sixth Corps had been rushed to the front. It arrived at 5:00 P.M. with the 3rd Division's 3rd Brigade, now commanded by Major David J. Nevin, leading the column. The brigade formed in a line just to the right of Little Round Top with its left flank joining the Pennsylvania Reserves. The 93rd Regiment (Lebanon Infantry), heading the brigade, was the first regiment of the corps to get into action. By the time the corps had arrived, the Union line had been pushed back to the slopes of Little Round Top and the southern part of Cemetery Ridge. The arrival of the Sixth Corps was just in time to save the whole front from collapsing. The 93rd Regiment, seeing the approaching enemy columns, took positions behind a stone fence about 300 feet west of Plum Run. Here the regiment lay completely concealed as a Confederate column, unaware of its presence, advanced. The order had been given to hold fire until the enemy moved into point-blank range. Before the enemy column reached that point, however, a premature shot was fired and, even though heavy casualties were inflicted upon the Confederates, the desired degree was not achieved. In this encounter the Lebanon Infantry captured twenty-five prisoners.¹³¹ Following this brief fighting, the regiment, counterattacking to a stone fence bordering the eastern edge of the Wheat Field, drove the Confederate infantry unit back through the Wheat Field which was now completely trampled. The unit remained at this spot for only a few minutes and then moved to the defenses north of Little Round Top.¹³²

¹³⁰ Bates, III, 1211.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

¹³² Penrose G. Mark, *Red: white: and blue badge, Pennsylvania veteran volunteers; a history of the 93rd Regiment, known as the "Lebanon Infantry" and "one of the 300 fighting regiments" from September 12th, 1861 to June 27th, 1865* (Harrisburg, 1911) p. 218.

Late in the evening a portion of the 93rd Regiment, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Reserves, was sent into the "Valley of Death" to recover a battery which had been abandoned in the retreat of the late afternoon and early evening. The combined forces were unable to comply with the order since the guns had already been captured by the enemy. The elements of the 93rd Regiment returned and rested until the next morning.¹³³ The Lebanon companies received only five casualties throughout the day's engagement.¹³⁴

It was during Longstreet's assault that Major General Gouverneur K. Warren, Meade's chief of engineers, having assisted Sickles in placing his line, rode to the crest of Little Round Top and found the hill, "the key to the Union position," unoccupied except by a signal station. Warren at once saw the consequences of failing to defend this spot for, if they could attain this hill, the Confederates could enfilade the whole Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Noticing the Fifth Corps, under the command of General Sykes, approaching from the north in order to support Sickles on the left, Warren rode at top speed to meet them. He immediately ordered the first two brigades he encountered, commanded by Brigadier General Stephen H. Weed and Colonel Strong Vincent, to follow him to Little Round Top. No sooner had they arrived than Vincent's brigade was attacked by the Alabama troops of Brigadier Evander M. Law, commander of the 1st Brigade of Hood's division. As a result of Warren's discovery and the subsequent arrival of the Union troops, the rebel assault was checked and Little Round Top was saved.¹³⁵

After four hours of desperate fighting, the Union salient had been broken and pushed back to Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet was now in possession of Devil's Den, the Peach Orchard, and,

¹³³ Bates, III, 289.

¹³⁴ Mark, p. 220.

¹³⁵ Tillberg, pp. 15-16.

generally speaking, the whole line which Sickles had held earlier in the day; however, the most important terrain feature, Little Round Top, was still in Union hands.

In the Confederate plan of action, Ewell had been directed to hit Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill in conjunction with Longstreet's drive. Ewell's attack, however, was not launched until after dusk. Although the Confederate line managed to gain ground, the advance was not pressed further and, as a result, the opportunity to strike a devastating blow at the northern Union forces was missed, for if General Johnson, commanding the left flank of Ewell's corps, had pressed his attack on Culp's Hill, which was then lightly defended, the chances are that the Union supply trains, located on the Baltimore Pike just east of the hill, would have fallen into Confederate hands and such a result would have proved disastrous.¹³⁶ It should be noted, however, that fighting in the dark, with mediocre communications, was not the most desirable way of carrying out an attack. As a result, a great opportunity slipped from Lee's hands.

The second day was now history. It is very possible that victory could have belonged to Lee but, as circumstances would have it, Friday, July 3, would tell the tale. There is no doubt that had Longstreet gained Little Round Top or Ewell taken Culp's and Cemetery Hills, the battle might well have had a different outcome. Despite these facts, Lee still held the higher hand; he had gained much ground, taken many prisoners, and was now ready to make his final bid. As a result of the operations of the day, Lee decided to follow the same general plan and to continue the attack the next day. During the evening Lee's hopes were bolstered by the arrival of Pickett's division from Chambersburg.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹³⁷ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 320.

By midnight, the field was quiet except for the usual noises and the sound of an occasional shot from the rifle of a picket. For two days the once peaceful countryside around Gettysburg had been the scene of one of the bloodiest turmoils in the annals of modern war; yet, one more day was to follow and add more blood to the already red-tinted countryside. Friday, July 3, would draw the final curtain on the majestic drama at Gettysburg.

THIRD DAY'S BATTLE (JULY 3, 1863)

Union and Confederate Lines of Battle

The morning of July 3 was clear and the battle lines of both armies were plainly visible (see Map 8). The Union front was now extended to Big Round Top. The Third Corps, having been relieved the previous night, moved to the rear as a support force. The left flank of the line was now controlled by the Fifth Corps, with its left wing extending to the crest of Big Round Top and its right wing touching the left flank of the Second Corps on Cemetery Ridge. No other appreciable change took place in the Union line on July 3.

The Confederate line, now extended to the western slopes of Big Round Top, remained intact along its whole course. The only modification was the addition of Pickett's division to the center.¹³⁸

In the early morning the battle opened on the Union right flank where the 1st and 2nd Division of Slocum's Twelfth Corps, under the command of Brigadier Generals Thomas H. Ruger and John

¹³⁸ Storrick, pp. 37-38.

W. Geary, respectively, advanced against the Confederate line held by Johnson's division along Culp's Hill. By 11:00 A.M., the Union troops had pushed the enemy across Rock Creek and were again in possession of the earthworks which had been lost the preceding night.¹³⁹ This was the extent of the fighting on the northern part of the battlefield on the morning of July 3.

Plan of Lee for the Third Day


The Confederate failure to gain sufficient headway on the flanks on July 2 doubtlessly led Lee to believe that Meade's flanks were strong and his center weak and, when the Southern commander received news of Johnson's retreat on the morning of July 3, he was even more certain that this was the case. Throughout the morning Lee made the necessary preparations to execute the assault planned for that afternoon. When he informed Longstreet early in the morning that he intended to send Pickett's, Heth's, and Pender's divisions against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Hill, the commander of the First Corps immediately voiced his objection to the projected plan. Longstreet declared to Lee that "no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position"; but Lee's mind was made up.¹⁴⁰ The attack would be made that afternoon.

In the meantime, Meade had begun fortifying Cemetery Ridge. Throughout the forenoon an elaborate line of fortifications was thrown up along the ridge, especially at its central point. With the development of these works and the location of a large reserve force behind the Union center, the line became an almost impregnable fortress.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Tillberg, p. 20.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.



MAP 8

LEBANON COUNTY UNITS, JULY 3

Activities of Units Containing Lebanon County Men

Buford's division, having been ordered from the field on July 2 and having camped that night near Taneytown, arrived at Westminster. The entire unit, including the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, was utilized to guard Meade's numerous supply trains in the vicinity. The division remained at this location until July 5, when it was ordered to pursue Lee's army (see Map 1).¹⁴²

The 107th Regiment, now commanded by Captain Emanuel D. Roath, who had replaced Colonel MacThompson when that officer had left the field during the previous evening, continued to rest behind Cemetery Hill throughout the morning of July 3. At about 2:00 P.M., the unit accompanied other elements of the First Brigade to the right slope of Cemetery Hill where it went into position in support of the 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, commanded by Captain Bruce R. Ricketts. Shortly after 3:00 P.M. the regiment was moved to the left of the hill and took a position just to the right of Ziegler's Grove in order to support a battery on the right of the 3rd Division, Second Corps, under General Hays.¹⁴³ The regiment remained in this area for most of the rest of the day and, although it had a clear view of the proceedings taking place to the west, it never was engaged. The only casualty was a trooper killed by a cannon shot just prior to Pickett's charge. Later that evening the 107th Regiment was sent to the front lines in front of Ziegler's Grove where it set up a skirmish line and, at the same time, repaired the damaged breastworks which had been used that afternoon. The regiment lay in this location until July 5.¹⁴⁴

The 142nd Regiment remained at its position of the night of July 2-3 until just before noon when, with the 121st Pennsylvania Volunteers, it was moved left about one-half mile to the western

¹⁴² Moyer, p. 51.

¹⁴³ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 294.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

side of the Taneytown Road.¹⁴⁵ Here it lay in open ground just to the right rear of Brigadier General George J. Stannard's Vermont Brigade, also a part of the 3rd Division, First Corps. Stannard's brigade occupied in the Union line the position later to become known as "The Angle." Just to the rear of this spot is the "High Water Mark," the furthest penetration attained by Pickett's gallant men. When Pickett began his now famous charge, the 142nd Regiment, with the approval of General Rowley, commander of the 3rd Division, advanced to a breastwork of rails just to its left front. The men went into position to the right of Stone's brigade which already lay behind the protective cover of the fence. The advance of the enemy troops being so well checked, the 142nd Regiment did little more than fire a few shots. The regiment stayed at this location until 9:00 P.M., at which hour it was relieved and moved to the Taneytown Road just behind its original position where the troops camped for the night. The only major casualty was Captain Charles H. Flagg, commander of Company K of Lebanon, who was instantly killed by a shell in the evening of July 3.¹⁴⁶

The 149th Regiment, having returned to Cemetery Ridge early in the morning, went into position just behind Stannard's brigade at which point the men threw up a slight breastwork of rails in the secondary line. Throughout the remainder of the day, the regiment lay behind this cover, and, during the cannonade in the early afternoon, the line was exposed to the fearful artillery barrage but managed to escape unscathed.¹⁴⁷ At the height of Pickett's charge, the regiment prepared to advance with fixed bayonets, but, before the unit could become engaged, the charge had been repulsed. The regiment promptly made camp and remained in position until July 7.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹⁴⁸ Bates, IV, 613.

The 115th Regiment, having spent the night just to the rear of Little Round Top, now moved with the 3rd Brigade a little to the left where it rejoined the 2nd Division, Third Corps, commanded by General Humphreys. Here the regiment replenished its supplies, preparatory to advancing to the right center of the Union line. After the cannonade of the early afternoon had ended, however, the whole division was rushed to the left center of the Union line. The 115th Regiment was placed in reserve to support the batteries between the First and Second Corps. Later in the day, the regiment returned to its original position behind Little Round Top where the unit stayed until July 5.¹⁴⁹

The 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry remained at its post on the left of General Pleasonton's headquarters until 2:00 P.M., when it was moved to the Baltimore Pike just to right of the Twelfth Corps on Culp's Hill since it was rumored that an enemy advance was expected in that vicinity. After erecting a number of barricades, however, the unit suddenly became aware of gunfire from the northeast. The troops immediately mounted and rushed toward the sound of the firing. Arriving near the Hanover Road, about three miles east of Gettysburg, the regiment went into position on the south side of the road but, in a matter of minutes, was forced to draw back because of fire from a number of rebel batteries. The unit withdrew to the vicinity of its location of the previous day near Pleasonton's headquarters.¹⁵⁰ The Confederates encountered were those of Stuart's cavalry force which Lee had sent to the east of Gettysburg to cut off a Union retreat, if Pickett's attack on the center should cause such a successful result.¹⁵¹ Late in the evening, the 4th Regiment rejoined its brigade from which it had been separated for the better part of two days. The regiment went into camp for the night and remained at this location until early the next day when it was moved north of Gettysburg.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 571.

¹⁵⁰ Nicholson, II, 832.

¹⁵¹ Tillberg, p. 27.

¹⁵² Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 1059.

Battery H, 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, remained at the rear of Cemetery Ridge, the position it had occupied the previous night. Acting as a reserve element for the artillery section of the Second Corps, the unit did not fire a round on July 3. The next day the battery started for Baltimore where it spent the remainder of the war.¹⁵³

The 93rd Regiment, having completed its part in the battle, lay behind the protective covering of the breastworks on the southern extension of Cemetery Ridge just north of Little Round Top. Here the regiment remained for the rest of the day. During the evening, men of the Lebanon units assisted in burying the dead. The next day the troops were sent out in small groups as skirmishing parties to determine the enemy's positions then being evacuated.¹⁵⁴

Pickett's Charge and the Conclusion of the Fight

Except for the engagement on the Union right and an occasional shot from a sharpshooter's rifle, an ominous silence prevailed over the countryside until 1:00 P.M. At precisely that hour, a number of rounds were fired from the Confederate battery located in the Peach Orchard. This was the signal for the entire line to open fire.¹⁵⁵ In another minute, 138 guns posted along the slopes of Seminary Ridge commenced firing on the Union defenses across the valley. After a few minutes, the Union artillery on Cemetery Ridge replied.¹⁵⁶

For almost two hours the earth shook from the deafening roar. Then, at 2:30 P.M., Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, commanding the Union artillery, ordered a slackening of fire in order to

¹⁵³ Nicholson, II, 952.

¹⁵⁴ Bates, III, 289.

¹⁵⁵ Tillberg, pp. 27-28.

¹⁵⁶ Storrick, p. 38.

cool the guns and to prepare for the expected attack.¹⁵⁷ This reduction in the rate of fire, according to Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, commander of the Confederate reserve artillery, led the Southerners to believe that the opportune time for attack was at hand. In accord with orders, with which he was not in sympathy, Longstreet ordered Pickett to advance.¹⁵⁸

Pickett started his charge across the mile-wide valley shortly after 3:00 P.M. More than 15,000 men marched into the teeth of death. After the long lines of Southern troops had crossed the Emmitsburg Road, the Union guns resumed heavy fire, but without deterring the advancing columns. Finally, after seeing his forces continuing under bitter fire until it was no longer possible to advance further and recognizing that the Union lines could not be taken, Pickett ordered a full retreat. Singly and in small groups, the remnants of the once-proud gray line withdrew across the fields toward the Confederate positions. Of the 15,000 men who had started across the valley, only about 7,000 returned.¹⁵⁹

Except for some minor skirmishes in the early evening and in the early morning of the next day, the battle had come to a close. Lee, seeing that disaster had befallen his army and knowing that further engagement was useless, began working out details of the retreat which he planned for the next day.

The Battle of Gettysburg had become history. In three days the Army of the Potomac had torn down a wall of military superiority which had taken the Confederates two years to build. Here the Union army had met, fought, and defeated a supposedly superior force. The North had taken a major engagement from the

¹⁵⁷ Tillberg, p. 28.

¹⁵⁸ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 360.

¹⁵⁹ Tillberg, p. 29.

much-touted Southern fighters for the first time. Never again would the Southern army offer its fullest quality to the Confederate cause. From this date onward, the cause of rebellion declined.

RETREAT OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

Lee Evacuates Gettysburg

General Lee began his retreat from Pennsylvania late in the afternoon of July 4. Leading the withdrawal of the Army of Northern Virginia were the long trains of wounded and the supply trains, all guarded by Brigadier General John D. Imboden's brigade of Confederate horsemen. This line was ordered to move by way of the Cashtown Road to Chambersburg, then proceed south through Greencastle, thence on to Williamsport, Maryland. Later that evening the corps of Hill and Longstreet began to fall back by way of the Fairfield Road toward Hagerstown. General Ewell, hampered by the heavy rains on the late evening of July 4, was unable to leave Gettysburg until just before noon on July 5 (see Map 2).¹⁶⁰

Meade Follows the Retreat

General Meade, having ascertained in the meantime that the whole Confederate army was in full retreat, dispatched the cavalry units, under General Gregg, and Sedgewick's Sixth Corps to pursue the fleeing rebels. The cavalry pursued the enemy trains on the Cashtown Road while the Sixth Corps followed the

¹⁶⁰ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 322.

Confederate troops on the Fairfield Road. The other elements of the Army of the Potomac remained at Gettysburg or in the near vicinity.¹⁶¹

In following Lee, the 93rd Regiment acted as a support force for the corps artillery and was not engaged.¹⁶² The 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry pursued the Confederates as far as Marion, a small town five miles south of Chambersburg, at which point, on July 6, the Pennsylvania regiment encountered the enemy rear guard commanded by Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee. After a brief encounter, the 4th Regiment returned to Chambersburg.¹⁶³

In the meantime, Buford, hearing of Lee's retreat and conjecturing that his trains would advance to Williamsport, struck camp at Westminster and proceeded to Williamsport where he encountered Imboden's cavalry on the evening of July 6. The Union cavalry division remained at its position until 9:00 P.M., at which hour it was removed from the area. The 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry was the last regiment to leave the field. The division then fell back to Antietam Creek where it remained until Lee had crossed the Potomac.¹⁶⁴

Lee Crosses the Potomac and Returns to Virginia

Lee and Meade were both hampered by heavy rains from July 4 to 12. The heavy downpours during this period, by the delay caused to Meade's forces, may have created an advantage for Lee, but they also hampered him. The rain prevented a rapid retreat and, as a result, brought about engagements with the slowly pursuing Union troops.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, 117.

¹⁶² Bates, III, 289.

¹⁶³ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. I, 1059.

¹⁶⁴ Moyer, pp. 66-67.

The whole Confederate army had arrived at the banks of the Potomac by July 7, but the rains which had interfered with the troop movements to the river now made it unfordable. The army then took positions along the river from Williamsport to Falling Waters, a few miles to the southwest.

Finally, on July 13, the river at Williamsport, although still deep, became fordable. In addition, a bridge had been completed at Falling Waters. That evening the order to cross the Potomac was given; however, with little warning, another severe rainstorm struck and, in the darkness, the crossing was halted. Early the next day the fording was again attempted. This time success was achieved. Ewell's corps started to cross at Williamsport and by 8:00 A.M. had completed the difficult task. To the southwest, Hill and Longstreet, encountering bad road conditions, only completed their crossings by 1:00 P.M. For seven days Lee had waited to get into Virginia; finally, on the afternoon of July 14, his army had arrived on its home soil.¹⁶⁵

Throughout the years, the fact that Meade did not pursue his quarry more thoroughly has given rise to numerous assumptions, one being that, had he done so, Lee's army would have been completely destroyed. This may have been true, but it should be noted that Lee's line from Falling Waters to Williamsport was very strongly fortified and defended, and, had Meade attacked, there is no doubt that the weather and terrain would have hindered a Union offensive action.

The Civil War was to last two more years and more bloodshed was to occur, but the most significant battle of the war had been won by the Union. Despite Meade's seeming failure to follow up his success at Gettysburg, the North had gained its greatest victory.

¹⁶⁵ Scott, XXVII, ser. I, Pt. II, 323.

CONCLUSIONS

The carnage wrought on the battlefield at Gettysburg resulted in 43,500 casualties of the 159,000 soldiers engaged. The Southern losses numbered 20,451 of the 75,000 men sent into battle. The Northern casualties totaled 23,049 of the 84,000 troops present at the battle.

The losses of men in units from Lebanon County were relatively light in comparison to the number of casualties suffered in the many other Pennsylvania units employed; 16 were killed, 50 were wounded, and 3 were missing, for total losses of 69 from among the 666 soldiers engaged. Company C, 149th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Company K, 142nd Pennsylvania Volunteers, sustained most of the casualties, 30 and 24 respectively, for a total of 54 of the 69 incurred.¹⁶⁶

In this paper an attempt has been made not only to present an account of the parts played by the units containing men from Lebanon County but also to emphasize that if it had not been for the contribution to the Union cause by one of these organizations, Company C, 149th Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiment, Gettysburg might well have been another Confederate victory. In the color episode on July 1, six Lebanon County soldiers, not knowing that their efforts might save the entire Union line, had risked their lives to deceive the enemy. If this deception had not been perpetrated, an estimated 10,000 Confederate troops undoubtedly would have been committed to action sooner than they were. Had these soldiers been able to contribute their might to the Southern line during the two hours prior to 3:30 P.M., when the flags were withdrawn, the Union front likely would have been crushed and

¹⁶⁶ See Appendix II, p. 269.

the Confederates probably would have swept the field. As a result of the engagement of the afternoon, the Union line held its positions until almost 4:00 P.M., when it was finally withdrawn toward Cemetery Ridge. Already, fortifications were being thrown up along the crest of ridge and by early evening the Confederates, not wishing to bring on further engagement until their remaining troops arrived, established camp for the night. The two hours gained at one small point on the large field enabled Meade to bring his forces to Gettysburg in time to occupy the heights where the Army of Northern Virginia would be defeated two days later.

The units containing men from Lebanon County gave their full contribution to the Union cause. Today the people of the county should be proud of the part played by the soldiers of this county at Gettysburg.

The tide of war had now turned. Men were to die on both sides for the next two years, but from the havoc of the Civil War emerged a strong United States. After Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Confederate cause began to decline in strength and support. Slowly the South was surrounded, and the contraction and strangulation of the homeland was begun. Piece by piece, the South was divided. Finally, on April 9, 1865, Lee surrendered at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.

APPENDIX I

ORGANIZATION AND SERVICE OF UNITS
CONTAINING LEBANON COUNTY MEN

Battery H, 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery (152nd Regiment), also known as Rank's Battery, was organized in Lebanon by Captain William D. Rank in the fall of 1862. With the exception of its participation in the Battle of Gettysburg, it served throughout the war at Baltimore where it was stationed to protect the city. The battery was mustered out on July 25, 1865.

Company F, 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (64th Regiment), was recruited on September 4, 1861. Like most of the other Lebanon regiments, it served in many campaigns. The company was mustered out on July 1, 1865, at Lynchburg, Virginia.

Company E, 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry (162nd Regiment), was enrolled on October 18, 1862, for three years' service. In addition to seeing action at Gettysburg, the unit fought at Petersburg and Winchester, and it was at Appomattox when Lee surrendered. It was mustered out on August 7, 1865.

Company E, 26th Emergency Volunteers, was inducted into service during June 19-22, 1863, for a sixty-day enlistment. It was discharged on July 30.

The 93rd Pennsylvania Volunteers, known as the "Lebanon Infantry," was formed under the direction of Colonel James M. McCarter, pastor of the Methodist Episcopal congregation of Lebanon, in the autumn of 1861. It was mustered into service on October 28 of the same year. The regiment trained for a month at Camp Coleman, now known as Monument Park, at present-day Eighth and Lehman Streets. In addition to service at Gettysburg, it also saw action at Fair Oaks, Antietam, Fredericksburg, the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, and in numerous other battles. It was mustered out at Harrisburg on June 30, 1865.

Company I, 107th Pennsylvania Volunteers, was mustered into service on March 5, 1862. In addition to serving at Gettysburg, the regiment saw action at the Second Battle of Bull Run, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Petersburg, and in a number of minor engagements. It was mustered out at Washington on July 13, 1865.

Companies D and G, 115th Pennsylvania Volunteers, of which a number of men were from Lebanon County, were mustered into service on January 28, 1862, and were discharged on October 28, 1865.

Company K, 142nd Pennsylvania Volunteers, was organized in Heidelberg Township in August, 1862, for three years' service. It was mustered out on May 29, 1865.

Company C, 149th Pennsylvania Volunteers, was enrolled in July, 1862, for three years' enlistment. Besides action at Gettysburg, the regiment saw service at Chancellorsville, Petersburg, and the Wilderness. It was mustered out at Harrisburg on June 24, 1865.

APPENDIX II

LOSSES AT GETTYSBURG OF UNITS
CONTAINING LEBANON COUNTY MEN

UNIT	Engaged	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total Losses
3rd Artillery Battery H	52	0	0	0	0
4th Cavalry Company F	35	0	0	0	0
17th Cavalry Company E	47	0	0	0	0
26th Regiment Company E	90	0	0	0	0
93rd Regiment	270	1	9	0	10
107th Regiment Company I	31	0	3	0	3
115th Regiment Companies D and G	27	2	0	0	2
142nd Regiment Company K	32	5	19	0	24
149th Regiment Company C	82	8	19	3	30
TOTALS	666	16	50	3	69

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